Nordic social risk management and the challenge of EU regulation : labour market parity at risk by Papadopoulos, Theodoros & Roumpakis, Antonios
 1 
Nordic social risk management and the challenge of EU regulation: 
labour market parity at risk 
 
Theo Papadopoulos and Antonios Roumpakis  
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been a long-standing consensus among the employer and employee 
representatives to decide upon management of social risks in the coordination of labour 
market institutions in the Nordic countries. This consensus has been built upon the idea of 
parity in collective bargaining, or labour market parity, which refers to the reciprocal 
recognition of interests between labour market representatives and to parity-based 
negotiations and agreements in which a consensus can be reached (see Kettunen, 2010). 
The principle of labour market parity is, in part, related to the Nordic conception of 
democracy as one of the founding pillars of social risk-sharing, as the principle was 
entrenched to the Nordic societies with the extension of democratic rights. As Kettunen 
(2010, 31) argues, trade unions were supposed to extend democracy in two senses: both 
as a ‘popular movement’ and as one of the two ‘parties’ making parity-based agreements 
on the labour market –  or, both as a part of the Nordic tradition of voluntary associations 
and as a labour market party. Both the institutional mechanisms of labour market 
bargaining between voluntary organisation representatives and the norm of parity-based 
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agreements are intrinsic to the Nordic model of organising power relations in the national 
governance of social risk management.  
 
In this chapter, we argue that the recent developments within what we call ‘the European 
social space’ prescribe many challenges for the future of collective bargaining in Nordic 
countries. In terms of labour market parity as a norm, the Nordic model does not quite 
correspond to the current European policies but rather provides alternative policies and 
ideas for the future of European integration (see the discussion on ‘flexicurity’, Lisbon 
Treaty targets, etc.). While there has been much critical review of the normative contents 
of the Lisbon Treaty and EU employment targets (see e.g. Carmel, 2005), there has been 
yet much less attention to the institutional effects of the integration process. In this 
chapter, we argue that the European regulation of labour market bargaining poses direct 
institutional challenges for the Nordic collective bargaining institutions built upon the 
parity principle in particular and for the national governance of social risk management 
more generally. 
 
Schematically, there are two streams of literature that discuss how the contemporary 
mechanisms of national collective bargaining have become under pressure in various 
economies. Many authors have highlighted the importance of globalisation as ‘a temporal 
and spatial reconstruction of social practices’ that widen power asymmetries between 
labour market actors and weaken the prerequisites for national social solidarity (e.g. 
Kettunen, 1999). Others have focused on changes in national labour market institutions 
and especially highlighted the employers’ role in promoting decentralised forms of 
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bargaining, flexible wage negotiations and regulation of temporary work (e.g. Dolvin et 
al., 2010; Lindvall & Rothstein, 2006). In this chapter, we demonstrate that these streams 
can be feasibly combined when we look at transnational regulatory mechanisms. To be 
more exact, they also ought to be combined in order to provide rigorous understanding on 
how the European regulatory environment poses challenges to the national labour market 
agreements in the Nordic countries. We argue that the ability of trade unions to act as a 
collective actor in the European social space is significantly hampered by a particular 
form of (emerging) meta-governance. The chapter continues with a section that provides 
definitions for the three key concepts in this insight – structural power, European social 
space and meta-governance – after which the characteristics of meta-governance will be 
studied empirically in more detail. 
 
In the third section of the chapter, we first examine what was regarded as a ‘neo-liberal’ 
attempt to integrate services market through the Services Directive (2006/123/EC). We 
consider this attempt a typical example of top-down models of regulating national 
industrial relations. Our empirical research then draws on the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) decisions in the cases of ‘Laval’, ‘Viking’, ‘Rüffert’ and ‘Luxemburg’. The 
Services Directive and the rulings of ECJ cases represent attempts to set competition as 
the main principle for regulating socio-economic life in the EU. The ECJ cases 
demonstrate that the main challenge for the governance of labour-capital relations in the 
EU is not solely the competition of wages between workers but rather how EU 
institutions might favour the inclusion of other collective agreements than the existing 
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national ones. In this way, there is not just a downward competition between wages, but 
also a competition between different collective agreements.  
 
In the fourth and last section of the chapter, we discuss the implications that stem from 
the creation of competitive markets at the European level to the future of the European 
industrial relations in general and to the Nordic industrial relations in particular. We argue 
that, fundamentally, the ECJ rulings are about the struggle over the ‘hierarchy of values’ 
that could frame the European social space and its process of integration. This is a 
struggle in which, so far, European labour seems to be on the losing side. In this section, 
we also explore what kinds of effects the power asymmetries within the European labour 
markets produce to the collective bargaining mechanisms that mediate labour market 
partners’ interests to social risk management in Sweden and Finland (with the Laval and 
Viking cases, respectively). We conclude the chapter with a reflection on the challenges 
that competition and market-based principles pose for the Nordic model of social risk-
sharing and to the potential attempts to apply the ‘labour market parity’ principle beyond 
the national levels of action. 
 
 
Structuring politics and contextualising action: power, social spaces and 
meta­governance  
 
The purpose of this section is to provide definitions for three key ideas and concepts used 
in the following sections of the chapter. The first one is structural power, which is crucial 
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for understanding the nature of labour market relations in different settings, in our case 
the difference between the Nordic labour market parity and the European labour market 
paradigms. When we use the concept of power we refer to a dynamic relation between 
social agents. We have intentionally distinguished power as a dynamic relation and power 
as a resource. Instead of referring to actors having power (i.e. the more colloquial use of 
the term), we understand social agents as exercising power by mobilising power resources 
in any or all of the dimensions of power: structural, relational and discursive power.1 The 
dimension addressed here is structural power, which can be seen similar to what Hay 
(2002) describes as the ‘context-shaping aspects’ of social action. Exercising power in 
this dimension is achieved by mobilising power resources in order to defend or alter the 
institutions and/or the mode of governance that regulates the distribution of the power 
resources – the rules of the game, that is.  
 
By exploring this dimension, analysis can potentially ‘capture’ the instituting capacity of 
social agents. Power asymmetries are observable as differences in the capacity of social 
agents to maintain or alter the ‘rules of the game’. In addition, changes in the form and 
content of institutions follow changes in the agents’ capacity to mobilise structural power 
resources. In this context, structural power is the dynamic relation between social agents 
intending to defend or alter how regulatory processes are consolidated institutionally. The 
outcome of this dynamic relation ‘translates’ into both the contents of the institutions and 
                                                
1 Besides structural power discussed in the text, relational power is the ability to force a social subject to do 
something that otherwise s/he would be reluctant to do, and discursive power the way that society 
recognises, understands and interprets social categories within the existing power-relations. Discursive 
power thus refers to the concepts, assumptions and perceptions of reality that are hegemonic in one or more 
social spaces of the society. Consequently power resources have relational, structural and discursive 
properties (see Papadopoulos, 2006).  This conceptualisation of power is a theoretical synthesis drawing 
inspiration from Lukes (2005), Strange (1994), Hay (2002) and Bourdieu (2005). 
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the modes of instituting them. Institutions are here understood as “structurations of power 
and as residues of conflict” (Korpi, 2001, 8).  
 
The second key concept in this chapter is the European social space. By ‘social space’ we 
refer to a spatially and temporally specific combination of a mode of governance, 
corresponding institutions, interacting agents and their power resources. The term is 
inspired by Bourdieu (1985) who used it to define a multidimensional field of social 
action created and institutionally (re)constituted by the power dynamics between social 
actors. A social space is regulated by a (territorially and temporally contingent) mode of 
governance, whose institutional architecture (as well as its logic of instituting) determines 
how power resources will be redistributed in the social space and, consequently, how the 
relational power dynamics between the social actors will be exercised.   
 
Although social spaces are of different regulatory scales (e.g. local, national or 
transnational), they are also linked to each other, often hierarchically. Thus it is not only 
the character of social spaces of action at different scales (for example the different types 
of national employment models, national production regimes or the ‘European social 
model’ etc.) but also how they relate to each other and how and at which scale their 
relationship is regulated that one must address here. In this sense, this chapter examines 
how the structural power asymmetry between unions and employers is currently 
articulated in the shifting levels of governance and spaces of action in the EU by 
examining how the interaction between national social spaces is regulated at the European 
level. It is argued that the locus of the power dynamics between labour and capital in the 
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EU is shifting from national social spaces into an emerging European social space. The 
latter is not merely a summation of national social spaces nor merely ‘European’ in the 
sense of supra-national but primarily a social space cum mode of governance that 
regulates the interaction between these two levels of social action.  
 
Finally, our chapter adopts an analytical definition of governance to refer to both the 
content of institutions in a social space and the mode of instituting it (see Carmel & 
Papadopoulos, 2003). However, governance is not only the mode of governing at one 
level of social action but also about governing the interplay between different modes of 
governance and between different levels of social action. To avoid conceptual conflations, 
we adopt Jessop’s concept of meta-governance to refer to the emerging mode of 
governance of the European social space (as defined above). We argue that the 
aforementioned shift from national social spaces into an emerging European social space 
is accompanied by ‘a re-articulation of powers and a re-territorialisation of social 
relations’ (Brenner et al., 2002), which is meta-regulated to favour capital and the market 
rationale of governance. Drawing from recent events in the development of EU labour 
relations, we argue that the ability of trade unions to act as a collective actor in the 
European social space is significantly hampered by the particular form of (emerging) 
meta-governance, whose characteristics we will next explore in more detail empirically.  
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Regulating labour relations in the European social space: from 
harmonisation to competition 
 
The Services Directive has its origins in the guidelines named after the Dutch 
Commissioner for internal market issues in the EU, Frits Bolkestein. The directive aimed 
at liberalising the provision of services in the European social space and at further 
integrating the services market as stated in the Lisbon strategy. According to the 
Bolkestein guidelines, services could be bought depending on the wage levels of the 
country of origin of the service provider. The initial plan of the guideline was to 
‘harmonise’ the internal labour market by withdrawing market distortions (national 
agreements) in the service sector in the European social space. Apart from 
‘harmonisation’, the possible adoption of the guideline would have cancelled the national 
collective bargaining and simultaneously provided the necessary regulation to promote 
downward wage competition between EU citizens. The proposal sparked fierce protests in 
countries with ‘coordinated market economies’, a term borrowed from the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature (see Hall & Soskice, 2001; Menz, 2003).  
 
Despite the political clout in several countries, the succeeding Commissioner McGreevy 
and the Commission President Barroso were putting through the reform agenda of the 
Commission, the Services Directive being at the heart of this agenda. The Services 
Directive was not welcomed warmly by the member countries. The idea of the ‘Polish 
plumber’, an example of undermining the wage and working conditions of French 
plumbers, managed to mobilise a majority that rejected the adoption of the European 
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Constitution. It was clear with the French non in March 2005 that the Services Directive 
had attracted very much negative attention – so much that it in part halted the approval of 
the whole European Constitution.  
 
Almost ten months later, the Services Directive was passed in European Parliament but 
with significant amendments limiting the impact of ‘harmonisation’. The split of 
employers’ interests, along with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
lobbying for the amendment of the proposal, paved the way for a distinct alliance of 
interests within the European parliament (Dølvin & Ødergård, 2009). In terms of voting, 
the social democratic parties and the Christian democratic parties voted in favour of the 
amended proposal. In contrast, liberal parties expressed their concern that the proposal is 
not meeting the needs for a ‘harmonised’ labour market. The conservative parties from 
Great Britain, Spain, Netherlands, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic rejected the 
revised proposal. Left wing and communist parties also voted against the proposal. The 
voting was very much based on “a mixture of a ‘left-right divide’ and a ‘clash of 
capitalisms’” (Höpner & Schäefer, 2007, 14).  
 
In the end, the Commission presented a proposal that incorporated the amendments voted 
by the Parliament and the European Council of Economic Ministers accepted 
unanimously the ratified proposals. ETUC was satisfied with the abolishment of the 
‘country of origin clause’ and regarded the end result as a ‘success’. However, ETUC 
remained less sceptical about the abolishment of the ‘respect for fundamental rights’ and 
its replacement to the respect of the Community law (European Trade Union 
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Confederation, 2006a). The ‘country of origin’ clause was abolished but replaced by the 
‘freedom to provide services’, which, as we will show, effectively introduces elements of 
downward wage pressures to the coordinated market economies. The replacement of the 
‘country of origin clause’ with the ‘freedom to provide services principle’ was neither 
thoroughly examined nor thoroughly understood by relevant actors. For example ETUC 
celebrated the exclusion of the ‘country of origin clause’ but, at least publicly, failed to 
capture the implications of the new legislation for the service providers in the private 
sector. 
 
The new legislation approved by the European Parliament links the Member States’ 
labour and workers’ protection to be interpreted in their compliance with the Community 
law by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on a ’case by case’ basis (European Union, 
2006, 11). Essentially, the right to collective action was not undermined directly by the 
Services Directive but was subjected to the approval of the ECJ doctrine on the 
proportionality of restrictions on the freedom to provide services (Novitz, 2008). Some 
have argued that ECJ rulings are not so much about labour rights protection but the ECJ is 
known rather for promoting business and competition-friendly rulings, while others have 
highlighted that the Community law as such is not about protecting labour rights (see 
Davies, 1997). 
 
As Supiot (2006) argues, the European Commission stated in its paper for ‘Better 
Lawmaking’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2005) that EU’s ‘regulatory 
environment’ should further promote European competitiveness through the creation of 
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an ‘expert committee’, which would assess and filter policy proposals that harm European 
competitiveness. According to the guidelines on impact assessment, new legislation has to 
be thoroughly scrutinised for its impact on economic and competition aspects at both 
national and European levels. The adoption of these assessment criteria prioritise 
competition and effectively pre-empt any significant attempts of new legislations to 
challenge the dominant logic of competition (Commission of the European Communities, 
2002, 2005, 2006). Further regulatory attempts should be kept at minimum level, thus 
locking the abilities of new legislature into a framework that promotes the market 
rationale. The market rationale “is no longer limited to the realm of the economy; it is 
now the organising precept of the juridical sphere” (Supiot, 2006, 116).  
 
In this way, ‘competition’ becomes the main principle of policy making, setting in motion 
a regulatory mechanism that rejects any policy that might harm competition and only 
allows policy proposals that are compatible with this logic. This ‘cata-regulation’ or 
‘meta-regulation’ (Supiot, 2006) provides a new mode of governance that 
 
tends to exclude or dominate competing ways of understanding regulatory policy choices. 
It institutionalises a presumption in favour of market governance, and this causes 
bureaucrats to reframe or ‘translate’ aspects of social welfare that previously may have 
been expressed in the language of need, vulnerability or harm into the language of market 
failures or market distortion. (Morgan, 2003, 2.) 
 
These attempts to ‘economise’ social spaces using ‘top-down’ means are witnessed 
strongly in the case of the ‘Bolkestein proposal’ and the EC directives. However, the 
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pressures do not stem just from the bureaucratic and political elites in the EU. European 
firms based on the EU legislation are effectively driving a competition between national 
labour laws (Supiot, 2006). As it will be shown next, many ECJ rulings did not explicitly 
touch upon harmonisation but instead opted for consolidating competition between state 
regulations as the key principle for regulating socioeconomic conditions within the 
European social space. 
 
Collective action vs. ‘freedom to provide services’: the Laval case 
 
All of the four ECJ cases discussed below illustrate significant turning points in the 
competition between state regulations and in the shifting role of national collective 
bargaining between labour and capital. The first case discussed here is the so-called Laval 
case, in which the City of Vaxholm in Sweden was interested to renovate a school and the 
city council selected the offer of the Latvia-based company Laval. In the agreement 
signed between the two contractors, it was stated that in order for the collective agreement 
between the firm and its employers to be effective in Sweden, collective bargaining 
should happen under the Swedish Labour law and the Swedish trade unions should thus 
participate in the collective agreements. Laval initiated negotiations with the Swedish 
construction union (Byggnads) but did not accept the terms and wage rates set by Swedish 
collective bargaining regulations and instead employed Latvian workers that would be 
posted to Sweden. Laval stated that it had the right to negotiate wages according to the 
Latvian collective agreements. Byggnads exercised their right – in accordance with 
Swedish labour law – and reacted with industrial action and a blockade. 
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The first collective agreement in Latvia came in 2004 and covered only the members of 
the trade unions. Since Laval workers were not unionised, the company could not have 
legally stated in the Vaxholm case that it followed the Latvian collective agreement. 
However, soon after the first agreement, a second national collective agreement became 
effective in Latvia. It provided coverage to all employees and issued that workers in 
Latvian companies can be legally represented only by the Latvian trade unions and 
therefore any collective agreement should be in accordance with the Latvian laws 
(Byggnads, 2005). The response of the Latvian government, the alteration of the coverage 
of the collective agreement, was both reflexive and strategic. It outright manifests how 
important the role of the state is in facilitating competitive advantages for national capital 
interests. 
 
The Latvian company was able to exploit the confusion between the Swedish labour law 
and the EU laws. According to the latter and the freedom of establishment, every 
employer should pay workers at least the national minimum wage. The crucial point here 
is that the Swedish collective bargaining is not binding for all workers and employers, and 
the state will not enforce such agreements.2 Due to well-organised trade unions and 
employers’ associations, the Swedish collective bargaining achieves a great coverage and 
problems of collective action are thus dealt by the central and industry-level 
organisations. Despite their extensive legislative framework and application, the Swedish 
industrial relations do not declare a minimum wage. Part of the unions’ strength stems 
                                                
2 The same applies for Danish and German collective agreements. 
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from their negotiating power in determining wages with employers. Therefore the 
existence of a minimum wage would undermine their power as actors and as social 
partners. 
 
Laval pointed out that since there is no minimum wage and the application of agreements 
is not binding, the company is not obliged to pay the wage that is determined by the 
Swedish social partners. While the unions were backed up by the Swedish centre-right 
government, the Confederation of Swedish Employers (Svenskt Näringsliv, SN) supported 
and funded Laval’s case before the court. (Woolfson & Sommers, 2006, 59-61.) Laval 
took the case to the Swedish Labour Court and SN took it to the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) with the question whether the Swedish trade unions’ right to collective 
action is at odds with the ‘freedom to provide services principle’.  
 
In December 2007, the rulings of the ECJ were received with conflicting emotions from 
various actors involved in the case. SN was delighted with the rulings and stated that “this 
is good for the free movement of services. You can’t raise obstacles for foreign 
companies to come to Sweden” (Financial Times, 2007). The ETUC received the ECJ 
ruling with ‘disappointment’ and regarded the decision as a challenge for the successful 
‘models of flexicurity’ (European Trade Union Confederation, 2007a). It is clear from the 
rulings that the ECJ prioritised competition and the freedom to provide services over the 
right to collective action: 
 
It must be pointed out that the right of the trade unions of a member state to take 
collective action by which undertakings established in other Member states may be forced 
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to sign the collective agreement for the building sector – certain terms of which depart 
from the legislative provisions and establish more favourable terms and conditions of 
employment – is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult, for such undertakings 
to carry out construction work in Sweden, and therefore constitutes a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services within the meaning of Article 49 EC (i.e. provision of 
services). (European Court of Justice, 2007a, Point 99, parentheses added.) 
 
Coordinated action vs. ‘freedom to establish’: the Viking case 
 
The case of the Finnish ship Rosella, or its owner firm Viking Line to be more exact, is 
another court case that illustrates how EU is mediating a competition between different 
state regulations. The Finnish firm that operates the ship route from Helsinki to Tallinn 
discovered that if the ship was under the Estonian and not the Finnish flag it could benefit 
from lower wages and thus enhance its competitive advantage over other firms. The 
Finnish Seamen’s Union (Suomen Merimies-Unioni, FSU) contacted the International 
Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) about the intentions of the Finnish shipping firm. 
The ITF advised FSU that according to the Flags of Convenience policy, wages and 
conditions of employment are to be decided upon the Finnish national agreements 
irrespective of the company will to employ Estonian workers because the ship is owned 
by a Finnish firm. At the same time as the negotiations for collective agreement between 
the Viking Line and the FSU occurred, the company applied to the Court that no 
agreement would have an immediate effect (European Court of Justice, 2006). As a 
response, FSU declared a warning for industrial action in November 2003. 
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Viking Line appealed to the Finnish Courts in order to cancel the industrial action of the 
trade unions and also to ask for compensations. In December 2003, both actors re-entered 
negotiations and a new revised agreement was reached. However, in 2004, Viking Line 
addressed the UK Commercial Court since the ITF had its base in London. The judge’s 
decision was against the coordination of action on behalf of the trade unions. The decision 
stated that trade unions could result in industrial action for the re-flagging of the ship. The 
judge forced ITF to withdraw all letters to affiliated trade unions. The rationale of the 
decision was that the actions of the FSU and ITF was against the EU law and hampered 
competition. The Finnish unions appealed and the case was referred back to the ECJ. 
 
In the Viking case, the ECJ recognised a fundamental the right to collective action if all 
other means of protest are exhausted and if the action does not harm the freedom to 
provide services (European Court of Justice, 2007b, point 44-5). The vagueness of this 
ruling is rather obvious. (Can a right be both fundamental and restricted by conditions, 
especially if the latter are not clear?) The judgement of the ECJ is not denying the unions’ 
right to collective action in the national spaces of action but subjects it to certain 
conditions: 1) the action has to be a last resort and exhaust other means that do not harm 
operation of the firms and 2) that actions to block ‘the freedom of establishment’ are 
justified if they result in worse working conditions.  
 
While the rulings on the Viking case were received with more enthusiasm by ETUC, they 
missed a significant point in our opinion. The ECJ is safeguarding employees’ right to 
collective action as much as it is willing to prevent a coordinated action on behalf of 
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national unions within the European social space. The ECJ pre-empts abilities of unions 
to show solidarity through blockades in Europe since such action is deemed to exercise 
discriminatory effects on the freedom of movement for persons and to provide services 
(European Court of Justice, 2007b, points 57-66; see also Achtsioglou, 2010). The ruling 
of the Viking case manifests how the ECJ prevents coordination of union action across 
European social space and instead prioritises competition over the right to collective 
action. 
 
Counting losses: ECJ rulings on the Rüffert and Luxemburg cases 
 
Apart from the two cases that were discussed in detail above, two more cases ended up in 
the ECJ, whose decisions significantly challenged national collective bargaining and 
labour law across Europe. The Rüffert case refers to the ability of a Polish subcontractor 
to provide constructing services at 46.5 % of the wage rate that the German workers were 
entitled to. Similar to the Laval case, the ECJ declared that due to the lack of a minimum 
wage in Lower Saxony and to the lack of a universally (nationally) applicable collective 
agreement, any obligation for improving wages and working conditions under the 
German public law is not applicable but restrictive to the fundamental freedom to provide 
services (Schalchter & Fischinger, 2009).  
 
In a recent judgment by the European Court of Justice (dated 15 July 2010) the German 
state was condemned over the practice of local authority employers to award contracts for 
pension services on the basis of a selection laid down in collective agreements. The Court 
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ruled that although the right to collective bargaining is a fundamental right, the European 
public procurement rules should prevail (European Trade Union Confederation, 2010). 
The ECJ ruling refers to the precedent of Laval and Viking cases in arguing that the right 
to collective bargaining is withheld in order to secure the freedom to provide services and 
of establishment with the European social space. In the ruling of the Rüffert case, it takes 
a step further to question Member States authority on determining public procurement 
law:  
 
While it is true that the right to bargain collectively enjoys in Germany the constitutional 
protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the German Basic Law upon the right 
to form associations to safeguard and promote working and economic conditions, the fact 
remains that, as provided in Article 28 of the Charter, that right must be exercised in 
accordance with European Union law. (European Court of Justice, 2010.) 
 
In the Luxemburg case, the European Commission suggested that the Luxembourgian 
application of the Posted Workers Directive (PWD) was too extensive. Luxemburg, in 
accordance with the PWD, set mandatory conditions under which posted workers can 
provide their services and effectively incorporated these changes under public policy 
provisions. The conditions were the following: 
 
• requirement of a written employment contract or a written document 
established in accordance with Directive 91/533 
• automatic indexation of remuneration to the cost of living 
• the regulation of part-time work and fixed-term work 
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• respect of collective agreements 
 
 The ECJ issued that the Members States’ demands over posted workers’ wages and 
working conditions, as posed by the country of destination, are restrictive to Article AC 
49 and the ‘freedom to provide services’ principle.  The ruling of the ECJ goes to suggest 
that “national mandatory agreements are applicable only when they do not violate the 
freedom to provide services” (European Court of Justice, 2008). In other words, the ECJ 
ruling in the Luxemburg case touches upon Member States’ jurisdiction on what consists 
of a public policy provision since the ECJ ruled that national mandatory agreements are 
applicable only when they do not violate the freedom to provide services (ibid.).  
 
 
The responses of the European Trade Union Confederation 
 
Before the ECJ rulings the ETUC, which represents the vast majority of unions across EU 
member states, called Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso for a  
 
carefully balanced approach (…) ETUC is not opposed to the development of the internal 
market or the free movement of goods, capital, services and workers. Nor does it promote 
protectionism. On the contrary, it seeks a level playing field between Member states, 
based on fair treatment and upward harmonisation of workers’ rights and conditions. 
(European Trade Union Confederation, 2006b, our italics.)  
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The ETUC responses to the rulings of the ECJ differed in the two cases. While it 
welcomed the decision of the Viking-case ruling since it recognised the right to collective 
action as fundamental (European Trade Union Confederation, 2007b), the decision for the 
Swedish unions was received with ‘disappointment’ (European Trade Union 
Confederation, 2007a). Almost two months after the rulings, the ETUC publicised its 
position stressing the importance of the cases and the need for Europe to ‘repair this 
damage’ (European Trade Union Confederation, 2008a). For the first time, ETUC stated 
in public that the right of collective action comes second after EU’s free movement 
provisions. It is clear that the plea for a balanced approach was not enough to prioritise 
social protection over competition rules, a hierarchy that should not come as a surprise 
since ETUC is not holding any significant structural power over EU decision making and 
clearly remains under the hegemonic vision of EU-elites.  
 
It was only after the outcome of all four cases that the European ETUC (2008b) changed 
its discourse and its secretary John Monks admitted: “the score at the moment is ECJ 4, 
European trade unions 0; and I do not exaggerate when I say that we are reeling at the 
score”. ETUC recognised that these cases were fundamental not only to the ability of 
unions to defend labour standards (e.g. wages and working conditions) but also in the 
sense that collective bargaining and national labour law came second to the freedom to 
provide services and  firms’ right to establishment. As the ETUC recognised,  
 
the ECJ seems to confirm a hierarchy of norms (in the Viking and Laval cases), with 
market freedoms highest in the hierarchy, and collective bargaining and action in second 
place. This means that organised labour is limited in its response to the unlimited exercise 
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of free movement provisions by business which apparently does not have to justify itself. 
Any company in a transnational dispute will have the opportunity to use this judgement 
against trade union actions, alleging that actions are not justified and ‘disproportionate’. 
[…] The ECJ interprets the Posting Directive in a very restrictive way. On the one hand, 
it limits the scope for trade unions (in the Laval case) to take action against unfair 
competition on wages and working conditions […] On the other hand, it limits Member 
States (in the Rüffert case and Commission vs. Luxemburg case) in applying their public 
procurement law or public policy provisions on situations of posting to prevent disruption 
of their labour markets and unfair competition between local and foreign service 
companies. (European Trade Union Confederation, 2008b, bold and italics in original). 
 
The response of the ETUC as well as its analysis of the ECJ cases admitted not only that 
the main European trade union originally underestimated the challenges that the Service 
Directive and the application of the Community Law posed but mainly that the ECJ 
decisions on these four cases clearly sets a hierarchy of norms and priorities regarding the 
instituting logic of the emergent European social space.  
 
Responding to ECJ ruling in the Rüffert case, John Monks, the General Secretary of the 
European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) made the following statement: 
 
This is another damaging judgement for social Europe. [...] This judgment ignores the 
public authorities’ independence when they are acting as employers. More worryingly, it 
also confirms the supremacy of economic freedoms over fundamental social rights. The 
dark series initiated by the Viking and Laval cases is far from being over. (European 
Trade Union Confederation, 2010.) 
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The response of the ETUC leaves no doubt that power imbalances are widening but at the 
same time demonstrate the weak position in which the ETUC is placed in terms of 
‘balancing’ policy making within the European social space. Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the PWD subscribes to a minimum core of labour rights and allows 
foreign service providers to circumvent collective bargaining as set by the host country’s 
labour institutions (Cremers, 2008). 
 
 
The impact of meta­regulation on national labour institutions and trade 
unions: the end to Nordic labour market parity? 
 
We have highlighted at least two tensions that arise from the ECJ rulings. First, the power 
asymmetries between labour and capital are widening. It is clear in the ECJ cases that 
unions and employers strategically aimed at exercising their power not at their national or 
EU levels but, more importantly, within the emerging European social space of action. 
Firms such as Laval and Viking Line were willing to exploit the confusion among EU and 
national labour laws while the SN strategically aimed at undermining the institutional 
context that is meant to be facilitating its competitive advantage. Therefore employers 
mobilised their power resources at both the national and European spaces of action.  
 
The ability of the unions to respond to these pressures through collective action in the 
national social space was condemned for harming competition and for violating the 
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‘freedom to provide services’ principle in the case of Laval in particular. In the Viking 
case, unions were able to act in coordination and effectively form a pan-European 
blockade that did not allow the Finnish firm to operate with Estonian wages and working 
conditions. The ability of unions to act in a coordinated manner across the European 
social space was, however, interpreted as a ‘discriminatory action’ against firms ‘freedom 
of establishment’. Therefore the ability of unions to protect wages and working conditions 
from the logic of market competition is hampered by what Wood (2004) calls the ‘extra-
economic’, or an effort mostly concerned with the regulation of the economic, political 
and juridical coercion on social relations.  
 
Secondly, the emerging European social space is indeed challenging national labour and 
political institutions. The first two ECJ cases discussed above illustrate the role of EU as 
framing different institutional orders for domestic actors. The literature on European 
integration so far stresses either the importance of nation states as the key actors 
(Moravcsik, 1993; Martin, 2004) while others (e.g. Fligstein & Sweet, 2002) prioritise the 
importance of European institutions in driving European integration. We argue that 
focusing on the national or/and the European level (the EU) is not adequately capturing 
the process of European integration. The process is equally much about the criteria and 
the hierarchy of norms underlying the process of institutionally constructing the European 
social space that could effectively undermine the perpetuation of national market 
economies and their labour market institutions.  
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The ECJ cases demonstrate that the challenge for the governance of the European labour 
markets is not solely related to the competition of wages but also to how EU institutions 
might favour the inclusion of other collective agreements than the existing national ones – 
especially so in countries where no minimum wages are set as universal and mandatory, 
which effectively introduces an attempt for regulation of competition between (national) 
state regulations. This meta-regulation is mediating the decisions of the power 
imbalances between regimes to the national space of action. These ‘attempts aim not only 
to ‘economise’ social spaces (Morgan, 2003) but also, crucially, to make competition the 
dominant mode of instituting that space. 
 
In essence, the ECJ recognises both social rights and market freedoms as fundamental for 
the regulation of the European social space. However, when these two principles collide, 
as they did in the cases discussed above, the ECJ decided to set a hierarchy of norms that 
puts competition as the superior principle for socio-economic instituting of the European 
social space (see Achtsioglou, 2010). In conclusion, the ECJ has exercised its juridical 
power to 
 
• prioritise the freedom to provide services over unions’ ability for collective 
action both in private (Laval case) and public undertakings (Rüffert case)  
• hamper the ability of unions to act in solidarity within the European social 
space (Viking case) 
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• challenge the EU Member States’ right to define public policy provision 
(Luxemburg case) and procurement law (Rüffert case) within their own social 
space 
 
These rulings may produce significant challenges for national collective bargaining and 
public policy to address social risks that are generated and present in the European and 
national social spaces. This, as such, can be considered a major social risk – the risk of 
failing to respond to changing social risks. This risk is essentially structural and at the 
heart of the European integration project. It concerns the role of European juridical 
institutions and their ability not only to set a ‘hierarchy of norms’ but also to question 
national collective bargaining agreements and the ability of nation states to determine 
public policy provision. Inferring from the rulings discussed in this chapter, it is clear that 
the ECJ prioritises market principles over the right for collective action to tackle social 
risks. 
 
The key question in the national contexts is how far market principles will continue to 
undermine and restrict rights that are considered fundamental in the national political 
economies. Some European national governments have already responded to the ECJ 
rulings. New German labour law withdrew the obligation for remuneration from 
collective agreements that are not generally applicable, Luxemburg exempted foreign 
service providers from the requirements of public policy provision (see Silva, 2010) and 
some states that have not set minimum wages, including Sweden and Denmark in the 
Nordics, are reforming their national labour laws.  
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It is clear that so far the ECJ has played a pivotal role in determining the priorities 
between social rights and market freedoms and demonstrated how European institutions 
challenge national governments’ authority to determine public policy procurement. That 
said, we do not expect nation states’ modes of instituting and models of political economy 
to wither away (Menz, 2003). However, what currently emerges from these rulings is a 
process of Europeanisation that emphasises regulatory competition among member states 
– a market for state regulations. The future of European national political economies and, 
in this respect, the future of all kinds of national institutional configurations in Europe is 
directly related to the institutional configuration of the emerging European social space. 
This space is not external to the development of the variety of welfare capitalisms and 
market economies.  
 
The Nordic model is not an exception to these pressures. For example, the ECJ poses a 
direct challenge for the Nordic model of social risk management via collective bargaining 
in one thematic area: the minimum wage. The ECJ allows member states to declare 
minimum wages that are generally applicable in order to allow variation (and therefore 
competition). At the same time, through the interpretation of the Posted Workers 
Directive (PWD), it suggests that posted workers’ wages and working conditions cannot 
be determined through collective bargaining institutions of the host member state but is 
subject to the minimum core of wages and working standards declared nationally in the 
member state. As a result, the ECJ undermines the institutional role and the rationale of 
social risk management, since it encourages employers to bypass national collective 
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agreements and prescribes competition as the main principle for instituting labour 
relations. 
 
The ECJ rulings touch upon the cornerstone of labour market parity: the determination of 
wages based on the recognition of reciprocal interests by both the workers’ and the 
employers’ representatives. At the normative level, it could be suggested that the ECJ 
rulings place the interests of employers’ first and regard unions as representing only a 
particular group within the society. At the institutional level, the declaration of a 
minimum wage in the Nordic countries ‘distorts’ the mechanisms of labour market 
regulation, since it essentially provides disincentives for employers to enter into 
negotiation and for unions to represent workers’ interests in the first place.  
 
Towards European labour market parity? 
 
As it was noted in the beginning of this chapter, the Nordic labour market parity principle 
can be regarded as an alternative to the current European mode of organising industrial 
relations. The alternative resembles the early position of ETUC, which requested for a 
carefully balanced approach to ensure level playing field between Member States and 
aimed at the fair treatment and upward harmonisation of workers’ rights and conditions. 
The plea of the ETUC can be seen as an extension of the labour market parity principle at 
the European level through the recognition of reciprocal interests between member states 
as well as between European-based labour market actors. The ETUC plea did all but lead 
to this kind of outcome. The outcome of the process was one of a great power struggle, 
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which ETUC tended to somewhat neglect. We have not yet witnessed a similar struggle to 
institute the parity principle at the European level. 
 
As we have showed, the shifting of governance and scale of action should be a strong 
signal for trade unions to react by re-orienting their actions to the emergent European 
social space. Unions’ responses at the national level alone are deemed ineffective and any 
attempt to promote protectionist measures will promote welfare nationalism at best.  It is 
clear that it is this new social space in which trade unions – among other social groups – 
should coordinate their actions and seek alliances. For example, the attachment of a 
‘progressive social protocol’ that will safeguard social rights over economic freedoms in 
European treaties, as suggested by the ETUC, could be extended to address not only trade 
unions interests but also other social groups (e.g. agrarians). The ETUC proposal aims at 
prioritising social rights over market freedoms but the call for such a protocol has, at least 
so far, fallen on deaf ears.  
 
For us, it is certain that the potential counter-movement cannot be exhausted in the role of 
organised labour or at the national level of action. It is in the thin new European social 
space that European trade unions among other social groups should coordinate their 
actions and expose socio-political character of the ‘economic’ and provide proposals for 
an alternative institutional order in Europe. For trade unions, it is also necessary to retain 
the effective capacity to operate as agents of social change in the emerging European 
social space in the first place. 
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